Breaking out of Pakistan’s Stop-Go Economic Cycles: Do the “Twin” Fiscal and Current Account Deficits Hold the Key? 1999-2019 by Amjad, Rashid & Shahzad, Almazia
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Breaking out of Pakistan’s Stop-Go
Economic Cycles: Do the “Twin” Fiscal
and Current Account Deficits Hold the
Key? 1999-2019
Amjad, Rashid and Shahzad, Almazia
Lahore School of Economic
2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/106064/
MPRA Paper No. 106064, posted 15 Feb 2021 01:06 UTC
17 
2 
Breaking out of Pakistan’s Stop-Go Economic Cycles: Do the “Twin” 
Fiscal and Current Account Deficits Hold the Key? 1999-2019 
Rashid Amjad* and Almazia Shahzad** 
Abstract 
Pakistan’s overall economic growth patterns since 1950 have been cyclical with periods of 
low economic growth in the 1950s and 1970s interspersed with periods of high economic 
growth in the 1960s and 1980s.  Since 1990, however, these stop-go economic cycles have 
been recurring more frequently and the duration of expansionary spurts have decreased 
while those of low economic or stagnant growth increased in years. The reasons for this 
post-1990 slow down have been a subject of considerable debate and discussion especially 
since Pakistan has been during at least half of this period under a dozen IMF programs of 
varying durations with only two being successfully completed and the rest being 
abandoned during their duration. 
The aim of this paper is two-fold. The first to review Pakistan’s economic performance 
during 1999-2018, identify the main growth trends and factors responsible for the overall 
poor growth performance in the period, except for a brief growth spurt during 2003-06.  
The second more specifically to analyze the role of the twin fiscal and current account 
deficits as the major factors in explaining this poor stop-go economic performance.   
We test the impact of the twin deficits on overall economic growth for the years 1980 – 
2018. Our results confirm that the twin deficits have a negative impact on economic growth. 
Between the two deficits, the fiscal deficit contributes more to the slowdown of the economy 
than the current account deficit. We conclude that economic policy makers in Pakistan, to 
break-out of the recurring stop-go cycles, must aim for the adoption of a policy of running of 
low and targeted level of the fiscal deficit.  
                                                          
* Professor of Economics, Lahore School of Economics, former vice-chancellor Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics (PIDE) and Chief Economist, Pakistan Planning Commission. 
** Research Fellow, Lahore School of Economics and former Assistant Director, State Bank of Pakistan. 
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Background 
During the period 1960-1990 Pakistan with an average growth rate of around 6.5% 
was one of ten fastest growing economies in the world. Over the subsequent 
almost thirty years 1990-2019 its average growth fell to around 4%. It should, 
however, be kept in mind that post-2000 despite this low economic growth rate, 
poverty levels fell drastically and using the Food Energy Indicator (FEI) from 
around 30% to less than 10% in 2013-14 (State Bank of Pakistan, 2016). During this 
period a vibrant middle-class began to emerge which according to some estimates 
was between 20-25% of the total households in 2015 (Durr-e-Nayab, 2011). Most 
analysts have attributed these favorable developments primarily to the almost 
twenty-fold increase in remittances from just over $1 billion in 2000 to around $20 
billion in 2018-19 or about 7% of GDP (Amjad, 2017). 
Pakistan’s overall economic growth patterns since 1950 have been cyclical with 
periods of low economic growth in the 1950s and 1970s interspersed with periods 
of high economic growth in the 1960s and 1980s.  Since 1990, however, these stop-
go economic cycles have been recurring more frequently and the duration of 
expansionary spurts have decreased while those of low economic or stagnant 
growth increased in years. The reasons for this post-1990 slow down have been a 
subject of considerable debate and discussion especially since Pakistan has been, 
during at least half of this period, under a dozen IMF programs of varying 
durations with only two being successfully completed and the rest being 
abandoned. Interestingly of the last two programs the Stand-by Agreement signed 
in 2008 initially for two years and then extended for another two was pre-maturely 
abandoned in 2011 without the allocated funds being disbursed.  The failure of the 
government to introduce the general sales tax (GST), a form of the value-added tax 
(VAT), to increase revenues and better document the economy and adjust energy 
and fuel prices to reduce the mounting subsidies were the two main reasons which 
led to its abrupt end.   The 2013 three-year Extended Fund Facility program was 
successfully completed in 2016. Currently the newly elected government is in the 
process of negotiations with the IMF for a new three-year program starting in mid-
2019 if a suitable agreement to the satisfaction of both sides can be reached. 
The aim of this paper is two-fold. The first to review Pakistan’s economic 
performance during 1999-2018, identify the main growth trends and factors 
responsible for the overall poor growth performance in the period, except for a 
brief growth spurt during 2003-06.  The second more specifically to analyze the 
role of the fiscal deficit as the primary factor in explaining this poor economic 
performance and whether the adoption of a policy of running of low and 
targeted levels of fiscal deficit in the future could provide a solution and move 
the economy to a more sustainable and possible higher growth path. 
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Pakistan’s Economic Growth Performance 1999-2018 
Figure 1: Pakistan's Macroeconomic Performance (1999 to 2018) 
 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (2017-18) and previous issues. 
The above figure shows Pakistan’s economic growth performance and 
inflation over 1999-2018 divided into four different phases: (i) a period of low 
economic growth 1999 -2002 following Pakistan’s nuclear test in 1997 (as a 
response to the test by India) and the placing of trade and economic sanctions 
and cutting bilateral aid and loan flows from the western powers; (ii) a period of 
high economic growth and low inflation 2003-2006 following 9/11, the removal 
of sanctions and increased foreign assistance including rescheduling of debt re-
payments and trade concessions and a buoyant global economy driving up 
exports and industrial growth; (iii) a period of stagflation 2007-13 following the 
unprecedented increase in oil and food prices and the global financial meltdown 
that followed in 2008 and serious energy shortages which led to load shedding of 
up to 8 hours in major urban areas and 12-14 hours in rural areas; (iv) a slow 
economic recovery during 2013-2108 with economic growth gradually picking 
up, a gradual decline in energy shortages mainly due to China-Pakistan 
Economic Cooperation (CPEC)  financed power plants and a fall in oil prices 
through most of this period ensured low inflation, though oil prices did increase 
at the end of this period. 
Turning Points in Pakistan’s Growth Experience (1999-2018) 
Pakistan’s fundamental problems are structural. To start with, are its extremely low 
levels of investment (see Figure 2) and savings – the former hovering between 15-
20% and the latter defined as national savings (domestic savings plus net private 
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inflows) around 10-12%. Productivity growth has been low especially total factor 
productivity (TFP), reflecting both low levels of investment and low human 
development indicators. It is also argued that the economy is over protected with 
high levels of protection though given a very large amount of imports coming 
through undocumented channels needs further study.  Its tax to GDP level at best at 
around 11% is also far too low to finance badly needed development expenditure. 
Figure 2: Total Investment as a Percentage of GDP (1998-2017) 
 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (2017-2018 and previous issues). 
Yet we find that Pakistan both historically and in the period being discussed 
has shown the capacity to achieve high economic growth when overall economic 
circumstances are favorable as during 2003-06. What then are the factors that allow 
or retard Pakistan’s sustained and at times high economic growth spurts? 
To find an answer to this question we examine the factors that resulted in what 
we can term as “turning points” in 2002-3, 2007-8, 2013-14 and most recently in 
2017-18 and their far-reaching consequences for the Pakistan economy. 
External factors, whether in the form of military interventions in neighboring 
Afghanistan or surge in international oil and food grain prices, have played a 
critical role in each of these turning points. The sad event of 9/11 that resulted in 
the invasion by NATO forces led by the US of Afghanistan, thrust Pakistan into 
the role of a front line state in the war against terrorism. In recognition of this 
role and the costs Pakistan had to bear in the fight against terrorism led to direct 
funding in the form of the Coalition Support Fund (which was recently 
withdrawn) and economic relief in the form of debt deferment and debt relief (or 
forgiveness) as well as selected trade concessions granted by the western 
coalition countries. 
These factors and the then military government’s economic and banking 
reform measures, led to a boost in business confidence and this together with 
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increase in investment economic growth. These favorable developments led to an 
increase in investment (both public and private), high growth in manufactured 
exports and overall economic growth rising to an unprecedented 9% in 2005. The 
IMF which had been initially reluctant to provide support also agreed to an enter 
into a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program with 
Pakistan in 2002 but which Pakistan ended pre-maturely as it had enough 
foreign inflow of resources including through rising exports. 
Figure 3: Brent Oil Prices (in dollars per barrel) 
 
Source: World Bank, Commodity Prices, February 2019. 
The second turning point in 2007-08 was directly the result of an 
unprecedented rise in oil and food grain prices in 2006 and the government 
inability to pass on these prices to the consumers (mainly due to public unrest led 
by lawyers protesting against the sacking of the Chief Justice of Pakistan by the 
government) and this led to the government running up an unsustainable fiscal 
deficit and current account deficit, each of over 8% in 2007-08. This left the new 
government which took over in 2008 with no other option but to turn to the IMF or 
face default as foreign exchange reserves fell to dangerously low levels. The 
resulting stabilization program plummeted economic growth to less than 1% from 
an average of over 6% in the preceding years and raised inflation rates to 
unprecedentedly high levels at over 20% in 2008-09 as food and energy subsidies 
were drastically reduced and wheat procurement prices more than doubled to 
international levels.  The economy never quite recovered from this shock and 
while there was a slight recovery the increases in oil prices again led the then 
government to leave an extremely high fiscal deficit of near 8% and current 
account deficit of about the same amount. 
Faced with an unsustainable fiscal deficit of near 8% and a rising current 
account deficit the third turning point was 2012-2013 that saw the new government 
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softer terms including a gradual decline in the fiscal deficit which led to a slow but 
sustained economic recovery. It was able to successfully complete the IMF 
program in 2016 but the increase in oil prices after a period of a fortunate 
downturn and reckless government expenditures before the elections in 2018 again 
led to its leaving behind a fiscal deficit of 6.6% and a current account deficit of 
around 6%. The new government that took over in August 2018 again faced the 
same dilemma as had its two predecessors. 
While the accounts of these turning points is by no means comprehensive 
and does not cover some important economic developments in the ensuing 
years, they show reasonably accurately Pakistan’s vulnerability to external 
events and external economic shocks as well as a history of poor economic 
decision making and economic management to cope with unfavorable economic 
developments. 
It could be convincingly argued that though external price shocks negatively 
impacted on the economy if they had been handled more prudently with timely 
and diligent economic management they would have, after an initial shock, 
worked themselves through the economy and not necessitated the harsh 
stabilization measures and sharp economic downturns that followed. The failure 
to adopt such policies was also the result of a lack of “political will” or fear of a 
public back lash especially in the years just before the general elections.  
The Role of “Twin Deficits” on Economic Growth  
Figure 4: Current Account & Fiscal Deficit (as a percentage of GDP) 2000-2018 
 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Reports (Various years). 
Theoretically, the link between the fiscal deficit, the current account deficit 
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economy. National income measured by GDP is the sum of private consumption, 
private investment, government spending and net exports (i.e. exports of goods 
and services minus imports of goods and services): 𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑁𝑋                         (1) 
Alternatively, we can measure national income as the sum of consumption, 
savings and taxes: 𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝑆 + 𝑇.                                  (2) 
Equation (1) and (2) can be rewritten as:  𝑁𝑋 = (𝑆 − 𝐼) + (𝑇 − 𝐺).                  (3) 
The above equation (3) shows net exports (NX = X-M) is the result of the 
difference between aggregate savings and investment plus the difference 
between tax revenue and government spending. If savings are less than 
investment, then it results in net borrowing from abroad. Similarly, if tax 
revenue is less than government spending then it results in net borrowing from 
the banking and public sources.  
Equation (3) shows that a rise in the fiscal deficit (T-G) must be compensated 
by an increase in domestic savings, otherwise it will result in a widening of the 
trade deficit (NX). If domestic savings do not increase, then the rise in the fiscal 
deficit will result in a widening of the trade deficit which would then have to be 
financed by foreign borrowings. The latter leaves the economy more vulnerable 
to external shocks, especially if foreign exchange reserves are very low.  
Barro (1974), proposed an alternative hypothesis; the Ricardian Equivalence 
Hypothesis that suggests the fiscal deficit is unlikely to result in a current 
account deficit as the reduction in government savings through a tax cut are 
compensated by the increase in private savings, leaving the total level of national 
savings unchanged. Therefore, the current account deficit also remains 
unchanged. In case national savings fall, the economy will have to rely on foreign 
borrowings that can weaken the current account position. 
Studies conducted by Cavallo (2005) and Kim and Roibini (2008), discuss the 
twin divergence, i.e. a negative association between the fiscal and the current 
account deficit. They argue that an increase in interest rates as a result of 
government crowding out of private investment will boost private savings 
leading to a fall in aggregate demand for imports that improves the current 
account deficit.  
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Empirical Assessment 
To empirically test the impact of the twin deficits on overall economic growth, 
we ran a simple linear regression using the ARIMA model for the years 1980 – 
2018. To further study the dynamic relationship between the two deficits and 
economic growth, a vector autoregressive (VAR) model was used. We used three 
series in both the models: fiscal and current account deficits taken as a 
percentage of GDP and real GDP growth as a measure of economic growth.  
Prior to estimating the models, we checked for stationarity of the series, i.e. 
whether or not they had a unit root. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test was used 
and we found that all were non-stationary at level but become stationary at first 
difference. The three series also displayed characteristics of an autoregressive 
process of order 1. Johansen co-integration test was also carried out to check for 
the presence of co-integration between the series. The test results indicated no co-
integration relationships. The optimal lag-length recommended by the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Schwartz-Bayes information criterion (SBIC) for 
the VAR model was 1.  
Based on the pre-estimation tests, we therefore estimated an ARIMA (1,1,0) 
model and a VAR(1) model. For the ARIMA (1,1,0) model we also created an 
interaction term of the current and fiscal deficit and used its lagged values in the 
model. The results of the regression are given below: 
Economic growth = -0.06  
Lagged economic growth*** – 0.56  
Fiscal deficit – 0.03  
Current account deficit – 0.10  
Lagged current fiscal deficit*** - 0.06 
(Note: *** represents significance at 1% level)  
The results suggest that both current and fiscal deficits negatively affect 
economic growth but neither of the variables turned out to be significant. In line 
with the twin hypotheses we observed that when the economy suffers from both 
deficits, it has a significantly negative impact on economic growth.  
In the second step, we estimated the VAR(1) model and obtained the 
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for a fiscal deficit shock and current account 
deficit shock to the economy. Certain assumptions about the causal structure of 
these three variables were imposed in the model through their ordering. Two 
scenarios have been tested, in the first fiscal deficit results in a current account 
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deficit and in reduction of economic growth. In the second, a rise in the current 
account deficit results in a rise in fiscal deficit which leads to the slowing down 
of economic growth.   
Figure 5 below shows the IRFs for a fiscal deficit shock in the first type of 
ordering structure where the fiscal deficit affects the current account deficit and 
GDP. A positive shock to the change in fiscal deficit has a positive effect on the 
change in current account deficit but a negative one on the change in the real 
GDP growth rate. The fiscal deficit shock does not show persistence and returns 
to the pre-shock level within two years. However, both the current account 
deficit and real GDP growth takes between four to five years to return to their 
pre-shock levels. This is in line with the twin hypothesis, which argues that the 
fiscal deficit can lead to a current account deficit. The movement in GDP is more 
volatile than the two deficits; a sharp rise and fall in values can be observed that 
points to the recurring macroeconomic crisis the country faces in the form of 
stop-go economic cycles.  
Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions for Fiscal Deficit Shock 
 
Figure 6 shows the IRFs for a current account deficit shock. In the second 
ordering structure where current account deficits affect the fiscal deficit and 
GDP, a positive shock to the change in the current account deficit results in an 
increase in the fiscal deficit. However, this increase is much smaller as compared 
to the current account deficit’s response to a fiscal deficit increase. Similarly, real 
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GDP growth does show signs of a decline in line with the expectations but the 
effect is much smaller. The volatility of the growth response function is also 
lower as compared to the fiscal deficit shock. This indicates that although both 
the current account deficit and fiscal deficit shocks slow down economic growth, 
the former does not do so to the same extent as the latter.    
Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions for Current Account Deficit Shock 
 
To interpret in terms of Pakistan’s growth experience, we see that every three 
to four years Pakistan’s growth momentum becomes unsustainable leading the 
economy into macroeconomic crisis. The preceding events primarily point out 
the fiscal and current account deficits. As discussed in the earlier section on 
turning points in Pakistan’s growth experience, the 2007-08 downturn in 
economic growth was a result of the sharp rise in oil and food prices that were 
not passed on to the consumers, resulting in the government running 
unsustainable levels of fiscal and current account deficits. Similarly, in 2012-13 
and more recently in 2018-19, the newly elected governments at the time were 
each handed over an economy faced with a high fiscal deficit and rising current 
account deficits. The high fiscal deficit towards the end of each government’s 
period is also motivated by their desire to gain political support among the 
public. In each of these three episodes, the governments had to seek IMF support 
that sought for a number of reforms to be implemented, among which the 
curtailing of public spending has been consistently prescribed.  
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Pakistan’s Impossible Trinity: The Challenges of Prudent Economic 
Management 
Figure 7: Pakistan’s Impossible Trinity 
 
Overall, our analysis suggests that running high fiscal and current account 
deficits ultimately leads to a decline in economic growth and indeed, Pakistan’s 
recent experience suggests a major contraction in economic growth to regain 
macroeconomic stability. Our analysis on turning points suggest that the 
causation between these two variables may have varied over time and in some 
instances the rising current account deficit as a result of an external shock (such 
as rising oil and food prices or low export growth) may have led to an increase in 
the fiscal deficit. This was mainly because in most cases rising import prices were 
not passed on immediately to consumers and were absorbed by the government 
in the form of subsidies which resulted in a high fiscal deficit. 
The causation may also run the other way – the pursuit of higher economic 
growth results in increased imports especially of machinery and capital goods 
and this is not matched by a corresponding increase in exports. In a recent study, 
Chaudhry and Gul (2019, forthcoming) for the period 1982-2017 found the 
income elasticity of imports as high as 0.62 and price elasticity of exports quite 
low at -.32. 
Indeed, the pre-dominant view that has emerged over the years (Amjad, 1982, 
Hamid and Chaudhry, 2010, and Chaudhry and Gul, 2019) is that the foreign 
exchange constraint is the binding constraint on Pakistan’s economic growth for this 
leads to an unsustainable current account deficit. Indeed, both the empirical studies 
Hamid and Chaudhry (2010), covering the period 1987-2007 and Chaudhry and Gul 
(2019), covering the period 1982-2017 found that every time Pakistan’s growth rate 
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exceeded 5.6% in the former study and 4.5% in the latter study, the current account 
significantly deteriorated and made any growth rate above this unsustainable. This 
meant that periods of growth exceeding these growth rates in the periods covered 
must have been supported by large doses of foreign savings in the form of aid, 
loans and grants. This is best seen in the period following 9/11 when, due to large 
injections of such concessional aid and loans, the economy witnessed three spurts of 
high economic growth 2003-2006. 
The other question that needs to be explored is whether there exists a 
threshold level of the fiscal deficit and that running a fiscal deficit below that can 
result in the promotion of economic growth? While not adequately explaining 
the mechanism through which this relationship works Iqbal et. al. (2017) 
applying the smooth transition autoregressive model to time series data for 1972-
2014 shows that the threshold level is 5.57% which a priori seems on the high 
side given Pakistan’s high propensity to import. 
Prudent Macroeconomic Management 
The macroeconomic management of the economy has always been a 
challenging task not just for the economic policy managers of Pakistan but also for 
those of other South Asian countries especially over the last two decades in the face 
of external shocks and recurring unsustainable current account deficits. 
Pakistan’s stop-go economic cycles have been recurring more frequently 
post-1990.  This task of breaking-out of these recurring stop-go cycles is made 
further difficult as there are trade-offs between important economic objectives 
and political governments and the economic policy team have to decide to which 
they will assign a greater priority, as for example the pursuit of higher economic 
growth while exposing themselves to a unsustainable current account deficit. For 
this in many cases short-term relief is gained by borrowing in global financial 
markets at high costs. This situation over time becomes untenable and the 
government has to resort to strong stabilization measures to suppress aggregate 
demand by drastically reducing the fiscal deficit and restricting imports, in most 
cases as part of an IMF program.  
In this context the question this study explored was whether an important 
way of breaking out of Pakistan’s recurring stop-go cycles in the first instance is 
to prudently manage the fiscal deficit as a means of ensuring a more stable, 
sustainable and high growth path? 
Before we come up with our main conclusions we must point out that many 
important aspects of macroeconomic policy management have not been explored 
in this study especially the role monetary policy has played in the past in 
contributing to Pakistan’s stop-go cycle. While this is a major omission there is 
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perhaps ground for arguing that except for the State Bank demand stimulus in 
2002-03 to jump-start economic growth, monetary policy has in most of the time 
period covered been subservient to the fiscal policy stance of the government. 
Indeed, the government could never have run high fiscal deficits if the monetary 
authorities had not been accommodating. Monetary policy has been used most 
often as part of the stabilization program in the form of raising interest rates and 
reducing the money supply which has been adopted after the economic crisis 
conditions make such an economic path inevitable. 
We have also not analyzed in detail the role played by an overvalued 
exchange rate through limiting export growth or stimulating imports and thus 
worsening the current account deficit. Our results did not show that this variable 
was significant in influencing economic growth in the period that we covered but 
this needs more careful and detailed analysis. 
Finally, we have also not analyzed the role of foreign remittances in 
macroeconomic policy management. Clearly it has played an important role in 
bolstering the exchange rate in the face of stagnant or low growth of exports 
(“Dutch disease”) and made policy makers less conscious of the extremely high 
trade deficit run up, especially in recent years. 
Yet, despite these limitations our study supports the basic proposition that 
targeting a low fiscal deficit can serve as an important stabilizer against recurring 
stop-go cycles especially in a period of time when it is vulnerable to external 
instability and economic shocks. 
However, our detailed analysis of this general proposition of targeting a low 
fiscal deficit suggests that the circumstances that result in high fiscal deficits can 
vary considerably over time and limit the government’s ability to curb the rise in 
the fiscal deficit. Also our analysis suggests that the targeted value of the fiscal 
deficit varies across countries depending on their overall economic conditions as 
well as over different periods of time for a particular country. 
Another important conclusion that this study points to is that when going 
through a stabilization program to the extent possible, the drawing down of the 
fiscal deficit should be done gradually given its impact on slowing down the 
economy and negatively impacting on employment and poverty.  
The overall conclusion must be that economic policy makers in Pakistan in 
order to break-out of our recurring stop-go cycles must aim for and ensure that 
the fiscal deficit is carefully managed and monitored so that steps can be taken to 
keep it in check before the economy reaches a point when strong stabilization 
measures become inevitable.     
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